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The	 probability	 argument	 in	 Hume’s	 A	 Treatise	 of	 Human	
Nature	 (Section	1.4.1)	 has	been	widely	 criticized,	with	David	
Stove	calling	it	“the	worst	[argument]	ever	conceived	by	a	man	
of	 genius”.	 We	 explain	 that	 the	 argument	 is	 open	 to	 two	
interpretations:	 one	 that	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 probability	











purports	 to	 show	 that,	 if	 we	 rely	 purely	 on	 reason	 and	 ignore	 the	
sensitive	part	 of	 our	natures,	 then	all	 our	beliefs	will	 be	destroyed.	 In	



















greatly	 improved	 and	 deepened	 our	 understanding	 of	 this	 “least	
understood”	(Morris,	1989,	p.	58)	passage	in	Hume’s	writings.	Still	there	
remain	 confusions.	 In	 this	 paper	 we	 surmise	 that	 they	 spring	 from	
Hume’s	 failure	 to	 distinguish	 between	 two	 readings	 of	 his	 argument,	
one	that	is	in	accordance	with	probability	theory	and	one	that	is	not.	
	 In	 Section	 2	 we	 describe	 Hume’s	 argument	 in	 some	 detail.	 In	
Section	3	we	discuss	two	different	ways	in	which	it	has	been	analysed,	a	
formal	and	an	informal	one,	and	we	conclude	that	neither	is	satisfactory.	





Hume’s	 argument	 basically	 consists	 of	 three	 steps.	 The	 first	
encompasses	the	idea	that	all	“knowledge	degenerates	into	probability”	
(T	 1.4.1.1).1	 By	 this	 Hume	 means	 that	 we	 can	 never	 know	 for	 sure	
whether	 a	 particular	 proposition	 is	 true.	 This	 applies	 not	 only	 to	








as	a	 check	or	 controul	on	our	 first	 judgment	or	belief;	 ...	 this	
means	 all	 knowledge	 degenerates	 into	 probability;	 and	 this	
probability	 is	 greater	 or	 less,	 according	 to	 our	 experience	 of	
the	 veracity	 or	 deceitfulness	 of	 our	 understanding,	 and	










An	 example	 may	 help	 to	 understand	 this	 first	 step	 in	 the	 argument.	





































at	 last	 there	 remain	 nothing	 of	 the	 original	 probability,	
however	great	we	may	suppose	it	to	have	been,	and	however	









hold	 that	 all	 is	 uncertain,	 and	 that	 our	 judgment	 is	 not	 in	 any	 thing	
possest	of	any	measures	of	 truth	and	 falsehood”	 (T	1.4.1.7),	but	Hume	
hastens	 to	 say	 that	 he	 is	 no	 part	 of	 “that	 fantastic	 sect”	 (T	 1.4.1.8).	





reason	 would	 simply	 annihilate	 itself	 and	 all	 our	 beliefs	 would	
“terminate	 in	 total	 suspence	 of	 judgment”	 (ibid.).	 He	 concludes	 that	
reason	 is	 “deriv’d	 from	 nothing	 but	 custom”	 and	 that	 belief	 is	 “more	








Among	 the	many	 disagreements	 that	Hume’s	 argument	 has	 provoked,	
there	 is	 the	 controversy	 about	whether	 or	 not	 formal	 tools,	 especially	
taken	from	probability	theory,	can	be	used	to	understand	and	evaluate	
the	 argument.	 Some	 think	 they	 can,	 and	 we	 will	 call	 them	 them	 the	
‘formalists’.	Others,	 the	 ‘anti-formalists’,	 are	 strongly	opposed	 to	using	
probability	theory.	In	this	section	we	explain	their	positions	further.	




published,	 and	 Hume	 was	 a	 contemporary	 of	 Thomas	 Bayes,	 whose	
famous	 essay	 on	 probability	 was	 posthumously	 published	 by	 Richard	
Price,	Bayes’s	literary	executor	and	a	friend	of	Hume.	Doubtlessly	Hume	




his	 reasoning	was	 inconclusive	 (Peach,	 1980).	 Since	 the	 regress	 argument	 in	
1.4.1	is	among	the	arguments	from	the	Treatise	that	are	not	repeated	in	Hume’s	
later	 writings,	 David	 Raynor	 suggested	 that	 Price,	 perhaps	 in	 early	





	 Among	 the	 formalists	 there	 are	 some	 well-known	 names:	 C.S.	
Peirce	(1905),	G.H.	Von	Wright	(1941),	W.V.	Quine	(1946/2008),	and	R.	
Popkin	 (1951).	 They	 all	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 assume	 that	 Hume’s	
reasoning	 in	 the	 first	 two	 steps	 of	 his	 argument	 involves	 a	 simple	
multiplication	of	probabilities.	This	can	be	explained	as	follows.	
	 According	 to	 Hume,	 we	 cannot	 be	 certain	 that	 A	 is	 correct	
because	 we	 cannot	 fully	 trust	 our	 calculational	 capabilities:	 there	 is	










The	 same	 goes	 for	C,	 and	D,	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 formalists	 then	 appear	 to	
assume	that	Hume	reconstructed	the	unconditional	probability	of	A	as:		
	
	 	 	 P(A)	=	P(A|B)P(B).	 	 	 	 (1)	
	
Formula	(1)	is	of	course	incorrect,	and	in	Section	4	we	will	identify	this	
error	 as	 the	 heart	 of	 what	 goes	wrong	 in	 Hume’s	 argument.	 Here	we	
restrict	 ourselves	 to	 the	 observation	 that	 none	 of	 the	 formalists	




























limit	 that	 the	 chain	 goes	 to	 infinity,	 P(A)	 will	 converge	 to	 zero.	 Thus	
Richard	Popkin	concludes:	
	
Since	 [the]	 probabilities	 are	 smaller	 than	 1,	 the	 product	 is	
smaller	than	either	of	them.	…	This	process	of	introducing	new	
probabilities	 …	 can	 go	 on	 ad	 infinitum,	 and	 thus,	 the	
probability	 that	we	 could	 ever	 recognize	…	 that	 a	 particular	




many	 formalists	 appear	 to	 have	 come	 to	 the	 same	 conclusion.	 Some	
formalists,	 however,	 have	 criticized	 Hume	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 a	
multiplication	 of	 numbers	 smaller	 than	 one	 need	 not	 yield	 zero.	 A	
necessary	 condition	 for	 this	 to	 occur	 is	 that	 the	 higher	 order	
probabilities	 approach	 ever	 closer	 to	 one.	 Thus	 Quine	 (1946/2008)	




Hume	 is	not	 talking	about	 these	special	 cases.	Hume	 is	addressing	 the	
situation	 where	 a	 continual	 diminution	 takes	 place:	 he	 talks	 about	
something	that	in	the	end	becomes	nothing	at	all.	It	is	simply	irrelevant	




calculus	 can	 help	 us	 to	 understand	Hume’s	 argument.	 In	 their	 view,	 a	
formal	 rendering	 is	 not	 only	 useless,	 but	 actively	 blocks	 an	
understanding	of	what	Hume	was	after.	 It	can	be	noted	that	nowadays	
practically	 all	 the	 scholars	 who	 have	 studied	 Hume’s	 probability	
argument	adopt	a	more	or	less	anti-formalist	approach.	
	 Anti-formalists	 do	 seem	 to	 agree	 with	 the	 formalists	 that,	
according	 to	 the	 formal	 calculus,	 P(A)	 is	 computed	 as	 a	multiplication	
that	 converges	 to	 zero	 in	 the	 limit.	 David	 Owen	 even	 calls	 this	 a	
“mathematical	 truism”	 (Owen,	 2015,	 p.	 114).	 However,	 he	 maintains	
that	Hume	cannot	have	had	 this	 alleged	mathematical	 truism	 in	mind.	
	
	
The	 main	 reason	 is	 that	 such	 as	 truism	 has	 very	 unhumean	
consequences.	After	all,	if	in	the	limit	P(A)	is	zero,	then	in	the	limit	P(¬A)	
is	one.	This	would	mean	that	we	have	certainty	after	all,	and	this	goes	











	 In	 the	next	 section	we	explain	why	we	 think	 this	 conclusion	 is	
too	quick.	We	will	argue	that	the	standard	formalist	reading	of	Hume’s	
argument,	as	explained	above,	is	not	in	accordance	with	the	probability	
calculus	 (although	 it	 may	 be	 in	 accordance	 with	 what	 Hume	 had	 in	
mind).	If	we	reconstruct	Hume’s	argument	in	a	way	that	is	in	agreement	
with	the	calculus,	then	it	becomes	clear	that	there	is	indeed	something	






and	 anti-formalists	 are	mistaken	when	 they	 assume	 that,	 according	 to	
the	 calculus,	 P(A)	 goes	 to	 zero	 in	 the	 limit.	 Not	 only	 is	 it	 not	 a	
mathematical	truism,	as	Owen	maintained,	it	is	simply	false.	The	reason	
why	both	factions	made	the	mistake	is	that,	as	we	will	explain,	both	saw	
P(A)	 as	 a	 product,	 whereas	 it	 is	 a	 sum.	 The	 second	 claim	 is	 that	 in	 a	

















	 	 P(A)	=	P(A|B)P(B)+P(A|¬B)P(¬B).	 	 (1’)	
	
which	 is	 not	 a	 product,	 but	 a	 sum.	 Of	 course,	 the	 same	 goes	 for	 P(B),	
which	is	not	given	by	P(B|C)P(C)	but	by:		
	
	 	 	 P(B|C)P(C)+P(B|¬C)P(¬C),		 	 	
	
and	similarly	for	and	P(C),	P(D),	et	cetera.	It	is	somewhat	puzzling	that	
none	of	 the	 formalists	have	noticed	 this.	Perhaps	 it	 is	because	 in	 their	
lifetime	 the	 application	 of	 formal	 methods	 to	 philosophical	 problems	
was	not	as	common	as	 it	 is	 today	(note	 that	most	of	 the	 formalists	we	





formulas	 for	P(A)	and	P(B),	 then	what	we	obtain	as	 the	new	value	 for	
P(A)	is	not,	as	the	formalists	thought,		
	













	 This	 takes	 us	 to	 our	 second	 claim.	 If	 we	 iterate	 the	 correct	
formulas	(1’),	(2’)	et	cetera	infinitely	many	times,	then	it	turns	out	that	
there	 is	 something	 that	 converges	 to	 zero.	 This	 is	 however	 not	 the	
probability	 of	A,	 P(A),	 but	 rather	 the	 influence	 exerted	on	P(A)	 by	 the	
propositions	in	the	chain.	The	further	away	a	proposition	is	from	A,	the	
smaller	 is	 its	 contribution	 to	 P(A),	 and	 in	 the	 limit	 this	 contribution	




	 Imagine	 again	 that	we	 trust	 our	 calculational	 capabilities	 to	 at	

























no.	of	propositions	 1	 2	 3	 5	 10	 ∞	





is	 not	 zero,	 but	 5/6.	 Second,	 the	 further	 away	 a	 proposition	 is,	 the	
smaller	is	its	contribution	to	that	final	value.	P(A)	with	only	proposition	
B	 is	0.9,	 but	when	we	also	 take	C	 into	 account,	 then	 the	probability	 is	
reduced	to	0.86,	which	means	that	C	contributes	a	(negative)	correction	










0.3,	while	 the	 values	 of	 the	 unconditional	 probabilities	 are	 0.5,	 rather	
than	1	 (the	 latter	 reflects	 the	 idea	 that	we	 initially	 think	we	might	 be	
just	as	well	right	as	wrong	about	B,	C,	D,	et	cetera).	That	leads	to	Table	2:		
	
no.	of	propositions	 1	 2	 3	 5	 10	 ∞	




As	 in	Table	1,	 the	value	of	P(A)	 is	a	well-defined	number,	namely	3/5.	
However,	 in	 Table	 2	 the	 probability	 goes	 up	 rather	 than	 down	 as	 the	
number	 of	 doubtings	 increases.	 Yet	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 higher	
orders	 to	 the	 final	 value	 of	 the	 probability	 of	A	 once	 again	 decreases.	
Further	it	can	be	proved	that	this	final	value,	after	an	infinite	number	of	
doubtings,	does	not	depend	at	all	on	whether	we	set	the	unconditional	
probabilities	 equal	 to	 a	 half	 or	 to	 one:	 it	 is	 a	 function	 solely	 of	 the	
conditional	probabilities.	
	 Both	 tables	 illustrate	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 original	 belief	
not	only	fails	to	go	to	zero,	but	generally	approaches	a	positive	number	
that	 is	unique	and	well-defined;	and	 this	 is	what	usually	happens	 (the	
only	situation	in	which	this	does	not	happen	is	when	the	–	nonuniform	–	
conditional	probabilities	 in	 the	chain	rapidly	approach	1,	 that	 is,	when	
they	are	close	to	material	implications).	Moreover,	the	tables	show	that	
there	is	something	that	invariably	diminishes	as	the	chain	of	doubtings	
increases,	 namely	 the	 effect	 of	 higher-order	 doubtings	 on	 the	
unconditional	probability	of	A.	The	further	away	a	proposition	is	from	A,	
that	 is	 the	 more	 intermediate	 doubtings	 there	 are,	 the	 smaller	 is	 its	
influence	on	the	final	value	of	P(A).	
	 The	 tables	 reveal	 that	 the	 approach	 to	 the	 limit	 can	 be	 rather	
rapid.	This	should	remove	any	feeling	of	uneasiness	that	one	might	have	
about	drawing	conclusions	from	reasoning	that	goes	on	forever.	In	line	




diminishes	 as	 their	 number	 increases.	 This	 is	 because	 a	 few	 steps	 are	





3	 Of	 course,	we	 need	 a	mathematical	 proof	 to	 demonstrate	 that	what	we	 are	






Anti-formalists	 have	 protested	 that	 the	 standard	 formalist	 reading	 of	
Hume’s	 probability	 argument	 in	 Treatise	 1.4.1	 turns	 Hume	 into	 a	
negative	 dogmatist	 –	 and	 they	 are	 right.	 What	 they	 appear	 to	 have	
missed,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 standard	 formalist	 reading	 implicitly	
accuses	 Hume	 of	 having	 made	 an	 elementary	 formal	 mistake.	 That	
reading	is	based	on	a	faulty	formula	for	P(A)	and	wrongly	presupposes	
that	 the	 higher	 and	 higher	 order	 doubts	 form	 a	 multiplication	 rather	
than	 a	 sum.	 It	 thus	 takes	 Hume	 as	 claiming	 that	 the	 credence	 or	
subjective	 probability	 in	 A	 decreases	 to	 zero	 as	 the	 chain	 of	 doubts	
lengthens,	and	such	a	claim	violates	the	probability	calculus.	
	 In	 this	 paper	we	 have	 investigated	what	 happens	 if	we	 rectify	
the	 formal	mistake.	 If	we	reconstruct	the	chain	of	Humean	doubts	 in	a	
way	 that	 agrees	 with	 the	 probability	 calculus,	 then	 we	 discover	 that	







Hume	 have	 in	 mind?	 In	 ‘Of	 scepticism	 with	 regard	 to	 reason’	 Hume	
appears	to	go	back	and	forth	between	them:	most	expressions	point	to	
the	 invalid	 interpretation,	 a	 few	 indicate	 that	 he	 was	 thinking	 of	 the	
valid	one.	We	are	therefore	drawn	to	the	conclusion	that	Hume	failed	to	
distinguish	between	 the	 two.	This	 conclusion	appears	 to	be	supported	










invalid	version	of	his	argument.	For	probability	 theory	 teaches	us	 that	
the	 first	part	of	Owen’s	 sentence	hits	 the	mark,	but	 the	 second	part	 is	
false.	 It	 is	 indeed	 the	 case	 that,	 as	 the	 chain	 becomes	 longer,	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 ideas	 at	 each	 end	 of	 the	 chain	 becomes	 less	
direct.	 It	 is	 however	 not	 so	 that	 the	 certainty	 of	 the	 conclusion	 is	
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